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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION OF
PUBLIC LAND CONTROVERSIES
By HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK*

1.

T

HISTORICAL SKETCH

HE administration of the disposition of the public domain has

a history that goes back to a period before the formation of
the federal government. During the entire life of the nation the
problem of the proper disposal of the lands of the nation has occupied a considerable part of the attention of the government, and
the distribution of these lands has profoundly affected our whole
economic situation, and, through that, our political and legal history. In the beginning, when the policy was to sell the land for
cash to the highest bidder, the administrative problems were simple
but as the policy gradually changed to that of placing the lands
in the hands of settlers, or other claimants, either free of charge,
or for only a nominal price, and as the several acts under which
the lands could be claimed were enacted, the administrative problems became increasingly complex, and new machinery had to be
devised to handle them. From the very beginning, the policy of
having the controversies between the government and the claimants decided by administrative officers or commissions, and not
by the courts has been followed. As a result there has been developed a highly organized administrative machine which has now,
perhaps, passed the period of its greatest activity because of the
increasing scarcity of desirable public lands, but a study of which
ought to yield many valuable suggestions for the organization and
development of machinery to handle the different questions with
which we are confronted by the new economic situation resulting,
in part, at least, from the fact that we no longer have free lands
available for those who are dissatisfied with their present lot. The

features of this administrative system that are of special interest
for this purpose are the machinery and technique for determining

controversies, the power to make rules and regulations, and the
control of the administrative agencies by the courts.1
*Assistant Professor, Law School, University of Minnesota.

'For studies of the General Land Office as an administrative organ

see White, The Administration of the Land Office 1911, an unpublished
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The first step toward the general disposal of the public lands
was taken by the resolution of Congress, Oct. 3, 17802 providing
that the unappropriated lands ceded or relinquished to the United
States should be disposed of for the common benefit of the United
States and that "the said lands shall be granted or settled at such
times, and under such regulations, as shall hereafter be agreed on
by the United States in Congress assembled, or any nine or more
of them." By Ordinance of May 20, 1785, Congress provided for
the survey of the public lands and for the drawing by the board
of treasury of the lands remaining, after the secretary of war had
drawn the quantity required for the bounty granted to the continental army, in the name of the thirteen states respectively according to the quotas in the last preceding requisition on all the
states, and authorized the sale of the lands so drawn by the commissioners of the loan office of the several states. By a supplement to this ordinance, adopted July 9, 1788,' it was recited that
it had been found inconvenient to execute the provision that certain portions of lands be allotted to the several states, to be sold
by the loan officers in each state, and, therefore, that provision
was repealed and the board of treasury was authorized to sell the
lands not already sold or drawn for the army. In the meantime the
ordinance for the government of the Northivest Territory, adopted
July 13, 1787,5 provided that -the legislatures of the districts or
new states to be formed in such territory should never interfere
with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled. By the time the new government was organized
under the constitution the policy had, therefore, become settled,
that the national government, and not the several states, was to
control the disposition of the public lands, and that policy was
embodied in the provision that:
"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States."0
By the act which established the treasury department, act of
thesis for a doctor's degree in Widener Library, Harvard, and Conover,
The General Land Office, 1923, being No. 13 of the Service Monographs
of the U. S. Government, by the Institute for Government Research, Johns
Hopkins Press.
'1 U. S. Public Land Laws, Instructions and Opinions, c. 9, cited hereafter as Pub. Laids.
'Ibid. c. 14.
"Ibid. c. 28.
'Ibid. c. 20.
'U. S. constitution, art. 4, sec. 3.

MINNESOTA

LAW REVIEW

September 2, 1789, 7 it was provided in section 2 that it should
be the duty of the secretary of the treasury, among other things,
to execute such services relative to the sale of the lands belonging
to the United States as might be by law required of him.
The first local land offices, four of them all located in Ohio,
were created by act of May 10, 1800.s This act placed each land
office under a register to be appointed by the president with consent of the Senate9 and also authorized payments for lands to be
made to such person or officer as shall be appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate receiver of public moneys at
each of the places where the public and private sales are to be
made.'10 The act prescribes in detail. the duties of the register with
reference to receiving applications for sale, keeping records and
issuing receipts and certificates," showing that the practice of
making private sales of land on the application of individuals desiring to purchase was already established. No provision is made
for the settlement of any controversies which might arise, except
that section 7 provided that if two or more persons should apply
at the same time for the same tract, the register should immediately,
in the presence of the parties, determine by lot which of them
should have preference.
Apparently up to ihis time few, if any, controversies had confronted those in charge of the disposal of the lands. The military
bounties were administered by the War Department, " the refugees
from Nova Scotia, who had been offered lands, were required to
make proof of their claims before some federal or state judge, and
on the basis of that proof the secretary of war, secretary of treasury and comptroller of the treasury were to decide the quantity of land to which the claimant was entitled.' 3 But only a little
more than a year before the creation of the local land offices, Congress had granted a preference right to purchase, or a pre-emption
right, to those who had contracted with John Cleve Symmes, a
grantee of a large tract of land, to purchase lands which were outside of the tract as finally patented to the grantee,'14 and by section
16 of the act creating those offices, a pre-emption right was granted
'1 Stat. at L. 65.

82 Stat. at L. 73.
'2 Stat. at L. 73, sec. 1.
"2 Stat. at L. 73, 75 sec. 6.
"2 Stat. at L. 73, 75-79, secs. 7-9.
"Ord. May 20, 1785. 1 Pub. Lands, c. 14, p. 15.
'Act of April 7, 1798, 1 Stat. at L. 547.
"Act of March 2, 1799, 1 Stat at L. 728.
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to persons who had erected or begun to erect grist-mills, or sawmills on any of the lands therein directed to be sold.' These preeffption rights, and subsequent extensions of them to other classes,
and finally to all settlers, were the principal sources of the problems in the disposal of the public domain which led to the development of the administrative system in the land office. Before this
time, the only instructions from the secretary of the treasury which
are preserved in United States Public Land Laws, Instructions and
Opinions published in 1838,6 are directed to the receivers of
public moneys and relate to the certificates to be issued and the
records kept by such officers.' 7 Within five months after the
enactment of the act of May 10, 1800, he was required to answer
an inquiry from the register at Chillicothe as to the determination
of claims for pre-emption under section 16 of that act. He says:
"It appears to me that questions relative to the rights of preemption secured by the sixteenth section of the law will generally
arise under such circumstances as to be susceptible of decisions
only in the courts of law. In other cases, justice and policy recommend that the act should receive an interpretation favorable to
the claimants. So far, therefore, as the public rights are concerned, I recommend that the actual and continued occupancy of
a mill seat, connected with improvements of any nature upon the
land which clearly indicate an intention of erecting a saw-mill or
grist-mill, will be considered as sufficient to vest a right of preemption."' 8

Here we see a recognition of the distinction between the determination of the rights of a claimant as against an adverse claimant and as against the government which has persisted throughout
the history of the land department.
But it was in connection with claims for pre-emption by persons who had contracted with Symmes that the first provision was
made for administrative machinery for the decision of controversies. By act of March 3, 1801,19 those persons were again given
a preference right to purchase the lands contracted for and were
required to file a notice in writing with the receiver of public
monies at Cincinnati stating the nature of their claims or contracts.
It was further provided that the receiver and two other persons,
to be appointed by the president alone should be commissioners to
"Act of May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. at L. 78.
"Cited in this article as Pub. Lands.

?2 Pub. Lands 219.
Pub. Lands 221.
"2 Stat. at L. 112.
182
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ascertain the rights of such claimants. The commissioners were
empowered "to hear and decide, in a summary manner, all matters
respecting all such claims," to administer oaths, examine witnesses
and other testimony and "determine thereon according to justice
and equity, which determination shall be final."
By act of March 26, 1804, section 7,20 it was provided that
the register of the land office and receiver of public moneys at
Cincinnati should perform the same duties, exercise the same powers and receive the same emoluments as were enjoined on or vested
in the commissioners under the earlier act. The earlier sections
of the same act had created land offices at Detroit, Vincennes and
Kaskaskia and section 4 had made the register, and the receiver
of public monies of those land offices commissioners to examine
claims to lands under French or British grants, granting them
powers similar to those granted the commissioners under the earlier
act but requiring their decision to be laid before Congress and be
subject to their decision thereon. During the next two decades
numerous statutes were enacted for the settlement of private claims
most of which required a reference to Congress, but a few of
which gave the commissioners, or register and receiver as the case
might be, authority to make a final determination. 21 Other acts
'2 Stat. at L. 277, 280, sec. 7.
'Lands in Detroit District: By act of March 3, 1807, (2 Stat. at L.
437) the register and receiver and the secretary of the treasury were given
final authority to pass on claims of occupants to lands granted by that act;
by act of May 11, 1820, (3 Stat. at L. 572) the powers of the commissioners
to determine British and French claims were revived with the provision
these decisions should .be laid before Congress as provided in former laws.
Louisiana: Act of March 2, 1805, (2 Stat. at L. 324) authorized the appointment of two commissioners who, with the register of the land office,
should hear claims undet Spanish and French grants and report to Congress; by act of March 3, 1807, (2 Stat. at L. 440) the commissioners were
given power to decide finally all claims by residents to tracts not exceeding
one league square and not containing a lead mine or a salt spring; act of
March 10, 1812, (2 Stat. at L. 692) and act of April 14, 1812,. (2 Stat. at
L. 709) extending the time for claims before the commissioners required
reference to Congress for final decision; act of March 3, 1819, (3 Stat. at
L. 528) made separate provision for the determination of claims east of
the Island of New Orleans by the register and receiver, requiring reference to Congress; act of May 11, 1820, (3 Stat. at L. 573) authorized the
register and receiver to determine claims to land west of the Mississippi,
with reference to Congress. Mississippi: Act of March 3, 1803, (2 Stat.
at L. 229) authorized two commissioners with the register of the land
office to determine British and Spanish grants, subject to reference to Congress for final determination; similar provision was made in the supplementarv act of March 27, 1804, (2 Stat. at L. 303). Vincennes: Act of
April 30, 1810, (2 Stat. at L. 590) authorized decisions by the register and
receiver subject to final determination by Congress. Missouri: Act of
June 13, 1812, (2 Stat. at L. 748) authorized the recorder of land titles
for the territory to decide claims in the future with the same powers pos-
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allowed pre-emption rights in, certain cases without providing any.
method of determining controversies that might arise thereunder.2
Act of May 26, 1824,23 granting pre-emption rights in Arkansas
required the claimant to make proof of his claim to the satisfaction of the register and receiver.
In the meantime the General Land Office had been organized
as part of the Treasury Department by act of April 25, 1812,24
the chief officer being designated as commissioner, and being empowered to perform all acts touching the public lands as had theretofore been directed to be done by the secretary of state, secretary
and register of the treasury, and the secretary of war, or as should
thereafter be assigned to him. No provision was made in the act
for the determination of any controversies relating to the disposal
of the public lands.
By act of March 31, 1830,25 pre-emption rights were granted

to purchasers in possession of public lands whose lands had reverted to the United States for default in payment of the balance
due thereon, and by act of May 29, 1830,26 a pre-emption right

was granted to every settler or occupant of the public lands prior
to the passage of the act, who had cultivated any part of the land
in the year 1829. Both acts required proof of the facts giving the
right to be made to'the satisfaction of the register and receiver of
the land district in which the land lay, as required by rules to be
prescribed by the commissioner of the General Land Office.2 7 Subsessed, by the commissioners under prior laws, subject to revision by Congress; (Public Lands (1838) contains no earlier statute relating to Missouri. Before the organization of the Territory it would be governed by
the laws relating to Louisiana territory). By act of May 26, 1824, (3 Stat.
at L. "52) claimants were authorized to petition the district court of the
state for an adjudication of their claims. Florida: Act of May 8, 1822,
(3 Stat. at L. 699) authorized the appointment of three commissioners to
determine claims under British and Spanish grants, subject to revision by
Congress in case of conflicting claims under different governments and in
case of claims to an undefined area, or exceeding 1,000 acres; by act of
March 3, 1823, (3 Stat. at L. 754) the commissioners were authorized to
decide finally claims under the Spanish government not exceeding 3,500
acres. The requirement of references to Congress for final determination
seems not to.have been very material. All allowances by commissioners
of claims were confirmed and by act of June 13, 1912 (2 Stat. at L. 748)
claims disallowed by the commissioners for certain stated reasons were
also confirmed.
'For example act of Feb. 5, 1813, (2 Stat. at L. 797) giving a preemption right to certain settlers on land in Illinois.
"4 Stat. at L. 39.
"'2 Stat. at L. 716.
24 Stat. at L. 390.
4 Stat. at L. 420.
'By act of March 3, 1807, (2 Stat. at L. 455) it was provided that
anyone settling on public lands before he was duly authorized by law
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sequent acts allowed similar pre-emption rights to settlers on the
land at later dates who had cultivated in subsequent years.
These acts provided for no appeal from the decision of the
register and receiver, and no right to review such decision existed. 28
The only power of the commissioner to supervise the decision
was his right to suspend the issuance of a patent until direction
of Congress or the decision of a competent tribunal could be obtained. 29 By the act of July 4, 1836,30 the General Land Office
was reorganized and by section 1 of that act it was provided that
the executive duties appertaining to the surveying and the sale of
the public lands, or in any wise respecting such lands, and, also,
such as relate to private claims to land and the issuing of patents
for all grants of land should be subject to the supervision and con31
trol of the commissioner under the direction of the president.
Under this act the practice was established in cases where an entry
had been allowed on ex parte affidavits and the land was claimed
by another, to return the proofs and opposing allegations to the
register and receiver with instructions to call all the parties before
the local officers for an inquiry, allowing each party an opportunity
of introducing proofs and cross-examining the witnesses of the
other and on the close of the investigation the register and receiver
should forfeit any claim to the lands, and be liable to a money penalty and
to imprisonment on conviction, and it was made the duty of the marshal
to remove them. That act and later acts authorized settlers to apply for
leave to remain as tenants at will but they were required expressly to
agree to give up possession when the lands were sold to another. Even
after the pre-emption rights were given in 1830, jurisdiction over offensesunder the act of 1807 was extended by act of March 2. 1833, (4 Stat. at
L. 665). The second section of that act authorized the President to direct
certain Indian agents to perform the duties of marshals under the ict of
1807, and it may be the act was intended to meet a special condition. But
the settlers were occupying the lands faster than they could be surveyed
and -were forming local land clubs for their mutual protection. (See Conover, General Land Office 19). Though their occupation of the lands was
unlawful, it was a fact that must be recognized, and in the administration
of Jackson it is not surprising that such recognition took the form it did,
tiereby securing to them the fruits of their settlement and improvement.
For a reference to the power of these land clubs, see Smiley v. Sampson,
(1867) 1 Neb. 56, affirmed 13 Wall. (U.S.) 91, 20 L. Ed. 489.
'Wilcox v. Jackson, (1839) 13 Pet. (U.S.) 498, 511, 10 L. Ed. 264;
Lytle v. Arkansas, (1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 314, 331, 13 L. Ed. 153.
"3 Op. Atty. Gen. 93. 2 Pub. Lands 84.
315 Stat. at L. 107.
"By an order dated May 4, 1836, (2 Pub. Lands 92) President Jackson
had directed that all questions in regard to issuing or suspending patents
for public lands and in respect to which the Commissibner of the General
Land Office required direction or his direction was objected to, should
be presented to the secretary of the treasury for his decision and direction,
subject; as in other cases, to the supervision of the president.
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were to report the proceedirig to the general land office, with their
opinion as to the effect 6f the proof and the case made by the additional testimony. In Barnard's Heirs v. Ashlay's Heirs2 the
Supreme Court held such supervigion and control by the commissioner was authorized by the Act of Reorganization, 1836, "but
if the construction of the act to this effect were doubtful, the practice under it for nearly twenty years could not be disturbed without
manifest impropriety."
Section 5 of. the reorganization act provided for the appointment of a solicitor of the General Land Office to give an opinion
on all cases involving questions of law referred to him and also to
advise the commissioner on all questions which may -be referred
to him growing out of the management of the public lands.
The office of the solicitor was abolished by Act June 12,
1844,3 3 which provided that the duties of the office should be performed -by the recorder or other employee in the Land Office as
the commissioner might direct.
It was the practice under these temporary pre-emption acts
for the district officers to ask the commissioner for instruction on
doubtful questions, and for him to refer the matter to the secretary
of the treasury who could ask for an opinion by the attorney general. But if the subordinate officers were willing to make the decision, there was no way by which such decision could be brought
before the superior officers for review. In fact the attorney general refused to render an opinion which was requested solely because the climant desired it, it appearing that the department was
34
satisfied with the decision rendered.
By act of September 4, 1841,1- a pre-emption right was
granted to every head of family or widow or single man, over 21
and a citizen, or who had declared intention to become a citizen,
and who, since June 1, 1840, had made, or who should thereafter
make, a settlement in person on public lands, thus establishing permanently the policy of encouraging the settling of those lands
by giving the settlers the right to purchase'at the minimum price.
Section 11 of the act provided that all questions as to right of preemption arising between different settlers should be settled by the
register and receiver, subject to appeal to, and revision by, the
'(1855)

18 How. (U.S.) 43, 45, 15 L. Ed. 285.

"5 Siat at L. 662.

33 Op. Atty. Gen. 39.
"5 Stat. at L. 453.
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secretary of the treasury. Section 12 required proof of settlement
and improvement to be made to the satisfaction of the register and
receiver, agreeably to rules prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, and by section 13 the claimant was required to make
oath as to his right.
Section 11 was amended by the act of June 12, 1858, section
103 so that appeals from the decisions of district officers in cases
of contest between different settlers should thereafter be decided
by the commissioner, whose decision should be final unless an
appeal therefrom be taken to the secretary of the Interior. The
General Land Office had been transferred to the Interior Departr
ment on the creation of that Department by act of March 3, 1849.
In the first circular of instructions issued under the authority
of the Pre-emption Act of 1830,31 the only rule as to proof required the facts of cultivation and possession to be established by
the affidavit of the occupant, supported by such corroborative testimony as might be satisfactory to both the register and receiver.
The evidence must be taken by a, justice of the peace in the presence of the register and receiver and in answer to such interrogatories propounded by them as might be best calculated to elicit the
truth. On June 21, 1836, Attorney General Butler rendered an
opinion 9 that the provision that proof of settlement should be
made agreeably to rules prescribed did not empower the commissioner to authorize the local officers to receive anything as proof
which was not proof within the meaning of the word; he could
not dispense with the requirement of proof nor make regulation a.
to the weight of proof; as a general rule proof did not include the
oath of the claimant or other interested party and, therefore, entries
where the corroborating testimony required by the rule did not
amount to full proof were voidable. By act of July 2, 1836,40 Congress confirmed all entries made in accordance with the instructions,.
if they were in other respects fair and regular. The pre-emption
act of 1841, in section 12 contained a provision for proof in the
same language as the act of 1830, and by the following section
expressly required an affidavit by the applicant as to his qualifications to claim a pre-emption. The instructions under this act"
"11 Stat. at L. 319, 326.

29 Pub.
Stat. Lands
at L. 395.
"2
539.
"3 Op. Atty. Gen. 126.
4'5 Stat. at L. 73.
"Zabrislde, Land Laws 49.
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required proof by disinterested witnesses as to the fact of settlement, expressly stating that the affidavit of the claimant as to that
fact need ,not be required; that it was not legal evidence and should
not form part of the proof in reference thereto. The instructions
prescribed in considerable detail the method to be followed in the
taking of proof, required notice to adverse claimants and authorized depositions in certain cases.
In other respects the power of the Commissioner to regulate
the administration of the land system was not so strictly limited,
even though it was not expressly conferred by statute as was the
power to regulate the proof. From the very beginning the Commissioner had given instructions as to the proper construction of
the land laws, frequently based on the opinions of the attorney
general. Such instructions would have no binding effect in themselves, but they established the executive construction of the acts,
which the courts followed in cases of doubt. Sometimes, even,
new requirements were added. On January 1, 1836, a circular 42had been issued which provided that lands which had been ascertained to have been erroneously withheld from private entry,
should not be entered or located until notice had been given for at
least thirty days that applications therefor would be received. In
response to a request for a construction of this regulation, the
same Attorney General Butler stated 43 that no power to make the
regulation was expressly given to the commissioner by any act of
Congress, adding:
"I think, however, it is well warranted by the nature of the
case, and the general powers of the executive under the constitution."
By Revised Statutes, section 2478 the commissioner, under
the direction of the secretary of the interior was authorized to
enforce and carry into executioAi by appropriate regulations every
part of the provisions of the title (Public Lands) not otherwise
specially provided for. The revisors gave no references to prior
acts as the source of this section, indicating it was probably a
formulation of the practice established without statutory authority,
By that time fairly complete sets of instructions for the disposal of lands under the several acts had been developed, and in
addition a collection of practice rules."4 In 1880 revised rules of
'2 Pub. Lands 514.
13 Op. Atty. Gen. 275.
"See
various sets of instructions in Zabriskie, Land Laws, especially
pp. 493-506.
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practice covering litigated cases before the district officers and
before the commissioner and the secretary were approved. 4
Thus there was developed before the middle of the nineteenth
century a complete administrative machine for the determination
of controversies under the public land laws, with an original and
two appellate tribunals and with power to make rules governing its
own procedure. But it was not, itself, sufficient for all purposes.
When the proof showed a substantial compliance with the law, but
there was a failure to observe some technical provision, the Land
Office felt that it had no power to waive the objection, but in order
to protect the entryman the question would be referred to Congress. In course of time these cases became so numerous that by
act of Aug. 3, 1846, 4 a Board of Equitable Adjudication, as it
came to be known, was created. By that act the commissioner was
authorized to determine on principles of equity and justice, and
in accordance with general equitable rules and regulations, to be
settled by the secretary of the treasury (later the secretary of the
interior), the attorney general and the commissioner of the General Land Office conjointly, all cases of suspended entries and to
adjudge in what cases patents shall issue. The decisions must be
approved by the secretary and attorney general, and cannot affect
private rights of others. The original act was limited to two years
and required a report to Congress showing the cases in which
entries were confirmed or rejected but patents were to issue for
those confirmed and the lands covered by those rejected were to
revert to the public domain, so that Congress reserved no power
to revise the decisions. By act of June 26, 1856, 4 the earlier act
was made permanent and applicable to future entries, and its provisions were incorporated in Revised Statutes, sections 2450-2456;
section 2452 which contained the requirement that the board report
its decisions to Congress was repealed by the act March 2, 1895,48
section 3.
Revised Statutes section 2457 provides that these sections shall
apply to all classes of entries where the law has been substantially
complied with and the error or informality arose from ignorance,
accident or mistake which is satisfactorily explained, and where the
rights of no other claimant are prejudiced or there is no adverse
claim.
451

Copp's Pub. Land Laws 193.

49 Stat. at L. 51.

Stat. at L. 22.
4'28 Stat. at L. 807.
411
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It is -noteworthy that in creating this separate equity tribunal
Congress did not give to it an unfettered discretion to determine
each case solely on its own facts, but required the formulation of
general equitable rules and regulations in accordance with which
the discretion was to be exercised. Originally fourteen rules were
promulgated,4 9 but others have been added from time to time until
now there are thirty-three.50 Generally they cover some technical
defect in the proof caused by the fault of the local officers, or excusable neglect or delay by the applicants. Apparently Rule 27,
allowing a deserted wife and children to make final homestead
proof, created a new right to acquire land, but in Bray v. Colby51
it was held that the wife could not make cash entry of the land
after the homestead entry had been cancelled on contest, that she
had no right to the land, but by rule 27 was permitted to make
proof as her husband's agent when there was no adverse daim.
If the officers of the land department thought the case a
proper one for submission to the board, they were required to
specify the rule under which it was submitted or designate it as
special. In Hawley v. Diller12 the Supreme Court held that the
board need act only when the decision of the Land Department
sustained the right and that the secretary acting alone could cancel
an entry, which had been suspended to investigate a charge of
fraud, on finding that the entryman was acting for another. In
In re Woodicard" it was held that reference of any case to the
board rested within the discretion of the Land Department and
could not be claimed as a right, even though a similar entry had
previously been so referred. In that case a timber entry had been
made without a personal examination of the land. Other cases in
which a reference was refused were an entry by a member of the
Missouri Home Guard, invalid for want of due military service ;54
a homestead commutation entry not supported by necessary proof
of residence, and now claimed by a purchaser so that the non-alienation affidavit could not be made;5 an application for patent
verified by an attorney in fact when the applicant was a resident
and physically able to verify, the decision adding that apiplicant
"Zabriskie, Land Laws 422.
'Zabriskie, Land Laws 425; Copp's Pub. Land Laws 1465; (1890) 10
Land Dec. 502; (1910) 39 Land Dec. 320.
"(1884) 2 Land Dec. 78.
5'(1900) 178 U. S. 476, 44 L. Ed. 1157, 20 S. C. R. 986.
'*(1913) 42 Land Dec. 437.
"In re Carpenter, (1888) 7 Land Dec. 236.
"In re Lockwood, (1895) 20 Land Dec. 361.
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couldn't file a new application "for the reason that he has parted
with all title, and for the further reason that he is dead ;,,26
and
a mining claim where the notice was posted 819 feet outside of
the claim, which was not a substantial compliance with the requirement that it be posted on the claim.57
The parallel with the development of courts of equity was
continued when by act of September 20, 1922, Revised Statutes
sections 2450 and 2451 were. so amended as to vest all authority
previously given to the board, in the secretary of the interior. In
the report of the commissioner for the year ending June 30, 1923,58
it is said this legislation was proposed by the department to expedite the disposition of the suspended claims.
In 1862 the first homestead law" was enacted. It required
proof before the register and receiver and authorized the commissioner to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect. The
only new procedural feature was the requirement of notice to the
settler before cancellation of the entry on the grouna1 of abandonment.
Subsequent laws for the disposition of the public lands have
generally, either expressly or inferentially, committed the determination of controversies thereunder to the same organization that
had been developed in connection with the pre-emption claims, but
when the mineral land statutes were enacted a somewhat different
plan was adopted. By act of July 26, 1866,60 which first permitted
title to mineral lands to be obtained from the government, it was
provided that notice of application for patent to such lands must
be posted and published and, in section 6, that if adverse claimants
to any mine appeared, all further proceedings should be stayed
until a final settlement and adjudication are had in the court of the
rights of possession to such claim. The subsequent act of May 10,
1872,61" contained more detailed provisions governing the institution of suits in court by adverse claimants, which are now found
in Revised Statutes section 2326. When the bill, which became
the act of 1866, was being debated in the Senate,6 2 Senator Williams, of Oregon, who opposed the bill as a whole, objected to the
introduction of confusion into the land laws by entrusting the
r'In re Drescher, (1913) 41 Land Dec. 614.

"'In re Equity M. & Inv. Co., (1914) 43 Land Dec. 396.
'Page 26.
'Act of May 20, 1862, 12 Stat. at L. 392.

"14 Stat. at L. 251.

'117 Stat. at L. 91.
"Cong. Globe, 1865-66, pt. 4, p. 3230. June 18, 1866.
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determination of controversies to tribunals other than the Land
Office, which determined them with reference to all other public
lands. The provision was supported by Senators Stewart of
Nevada and Conness of California, who were the principal advocates of the bill, on the ground that the general purpose of the bill
was to follow the existing practice which was to have controversies
as to rights of possession of mining claims determined in the state
or territorial courts, that such controversies depended on local mining customs, and that it would be a hardship to compel the
claimants to present their claims to a tribunal in Washington for
decision. No charge was made that the administration of the other
land laws by the Land Department had not been satisfactory.
What were the relations between the Land Department and
the courts during this development of the administrative machinery
for the determination of controversies over the disposition of the
public domain? In the beginning there was an apparent endeavor
to avoid any encroachment on the court's jurisdiction freely to
determine controversies between private persons. The first instruction on pre-emptions stated that the questions would generally
arise under such circumstances as to be susceptible of decision only
in the courts of law.6 3 Many of the statutes for the determination
of private claims expressly provided that the decisions thereunder
should not defeat the right of adverse claimants to proceed in the
courts.6 4 The first case to reach the United States Supreme Court

in which the action of the Land Office was involved was Matthews
v. Zane's Lessce, 5 a suit in ejectment against a patentee in which
plaintiff claimed a. prior purchase at a land office which had had
jurisdiction over the lands, which purchase was made after the
enactment of a statute for the division of the land district but
before the organization of the new land office at which*the statute
directed the sales of the land in controversy to be made. In the
briefs, it was insisted that the secretary of the treasury had construed the act as not preventing sales at the original land office
before the organization of the new one and had issued patents
based on such sales, the only reason for refusing to issue the patent
to plaintiff being that the register failed to make proper return of
the sale. Chief Justice Marshall in an opinion of one paragraph
'2 Pub. Lands 221.
"Act of April 21, 1806, 2 Stat. at L. 400; act of Feb. 28, 1809, 2 Stat
at L. 526; act of June 30, 1812, 2 Stat. 765; act of May-8, 1822, 3 Stat. at
L. 699.
'(1809) 5 Cranch (U.S.) 92, 3 L. Ed. 46.
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merely stated that the lower court -properly construed the statute,
that the erection of the new district suspended the power of sale
in the original district. Thereafter Matthews brought a bill in
equity to compel the conveyance of the land to him, and again took
the case to the Supreme Court.6 6 This time he introduced direct
evidence of the construction of the statute by the Secretary of the
Treasury in accordance with his contention and again relied on
the rule that the construction of a statute by the executive was
persuasive, especially when property rights had been, acquired
thereunder. The chief justice wrote a somewhat lQnger opinion,
adhering to the former construction of the statute, in which he
replied to some of the arguments of plaintiff, but did not refer to
the action of the secretary of the treasury. Thus in the first case
to come before it, the Supreme Court not only failed to give any
weight to the decisions of the Land Department, but even ignored
the insistent argument of counsel based thereon.
In United States v. Percheman6 7 the court was required to
pass upon the finality of a decision of the register and receiver
rejecting a claim under a Spanish grant in Florida. The court
held that the language of act of May 8, 1822, section 4,68 which
apparently vested those officers with judicial powers to decide as
a court in the first instance for or against title, must be construed in
view of the purpose of the Act, as giving power only to determine
speedily the location of claimed grants so as to make possible the
sale of the rest, and the rejection was not a final judicial decision
binding the title. In Doe ex dem. Farmer'sHeirs v. Eslava69 and
Doe ex dem. Farmer'sHeirs v. City of Mobile ° a similar ruling
was made with reference to the powers of the registers and receivers under act of May 8, 1822.71

The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, so
far as the effect of a patent was concerned, was drawn in Bagndll
v. Broderick"2 where a patent was held conclusive in an action of
ejectment, even though there was a charge it had been obtained
by fraud. The case was distinguished from Ross v. Barland73 in
which conflicting patents had been issued and evidence was ad*'(1822) 7 Wheat. (.U.S.) 164, 5 L. Ed. 425.

11(1833) 7 Pet. (U.S.) 51, 8 L. Ed. 604.
"'3 Stat. at L. 699, 700.
69(1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 421, 13 L. Ed. 200.
"(1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 451, 13 L. Ed. 212.
."3 Stat. at L. 699.
"(1839) 13 Pet. (U.S.) 436, 10 L. Ed. 235.
"(1828) 1 Pet. (U.S.) "655,7 L. Ed. 302.
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mitted to show that the junior patent had been based on a prior
entry.
In Wilcox v. Jackson4 plaintiff claimed by pre-emption allowed by the local land officers under the Pre-emption Act of 1834,
while defendant, who commanded the troops in Ft. Dearborn,
claimed the land was part of the military reservation. Plaintiff
argued that the register and receiver acted judicially upon claims
to the right of pre-emption and that, no appeal having been given,
their decision is conclusive. Answering this contention the court
said:
"This proposition is true as to every tribunal acting judicially,
whilst acting within the sphere of their jurisdiction where no
appellate tribunal is created."
The nature of the action of the land officers was not determined, however, because the court held that the land was reserved
from pre-emption and that the officers in allowing a pre-emption
right thereto acted beyond their jurisdiction so that their decision
was not conclusive, even if they acted judicially in passing upon
the questions submitted to them.
In Lytle v. Arkansas7 5 the controversy was between a claimant of a pre-emption under the Pre-emption Act of 1830,, whose
claim was suspended until after the act of 1832 was passed, because
the land was then unsurveyed, and the state claim under a grant
of land to aid in constructing public buildings. After holding the
pre-emption claim entitled to priority, the court held that the register and receiver were constituted by the act a tribunal to determine the rights of those who claimed pre-emption under it and
if they acted within their powers, and their decision could not be
imptached for fraud or unfairness, it must be considered final.
Three justices dissented in this case.
In Barnard's Heirs v. Ashley's Heirs76 the register and receiver, when the question wag resubmitted to them on an adverse
claim, had rejected Barnard's claim to pre-emption, but the Commissioner had reversed that decision and ordered a patent issued
to him. The suit was to cancel patents issued to defendants, who
claimed under a grant fo the State and they contended that the
decision of the register and receiver rejecting the pre-emption
claim was final. The court held that under the Land Office Reor"'(1839) 13 Pet. (U.S.) 498, 10 L. Ed. 264.
"'(1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 314, 13 L. Ed. 153.
'(1855) 18 How. (U.S.) 43, 15 L. Ed. 285.
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ganization .Act of 1836,77 the Commissioner had power to supervise the decisions of the local officers so that it was no longer conclusive. An examination of the facts led the court to affirm the
judgment for defendants on the ground that complainants had not
satisfactorily shown settlement on the date claimed, thereby agreeing. with the register and receiver.
In Garland v. Wyn 78s the question of the finality of the decisions of the local officers was again raised, both parties claiming
pre-emption rights. Mr. Justice Catron, who had dissented in the
case of Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 wrote the opinion of the court and
held that:
"Where several parties set up conflicting claims to property
with which a special tribunal may deal as between one party and
the government, regardless of the rights of others, the latter may
come into the ordinary courts of justice and litigate the conflicting
claims. Such was the case of Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 212, and
the case before us belongs to the same class of ex parte proceedings; nor do the regulations of the commissioner of the General
Land Office, whereby a party may be heard to prove his better
claim to enter, oust the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. We
announce this to be the settled doctrine of this court. It was in
effect so held in the case of Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 How. 328, Cunningham v. Ashley, 14 How. 377 and Barnard v. Ashley, 18
How. 44."
The effect of the holding in the Lytle Case is apparently the
opposite of that reached in this case. There the parties set up conflicting claims and one answer directly charged that the proof to
support the pre-emption claim was false. The majority stated
that the decision of the register and receiver was final and did not
discuss the sufficiency of the proof of settlement. The doctrine
of this case had little opportunity to influence subsequent decisions
because the Pre-emption Act of 1841, sixteen years before this
decision, had given the Land Department authority to decide between conflicting claims of individuals to pre-emption of the same
land. One of the claims in this case was based on the act of 1830
and the other on the act of 1838 so that the Act of 1841 was not
involved.
In O'Brien v.Perry0 it was held that errors of law by the
register and receiver could be corrected in a suit at law to recover
"Act of July 4, i936, 5 Stat. at L. 107.
"(1857) 20 How. (U.S.) 6, 15 L. Ed. 801.
"(1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 314, 13 L. Ed. 153.

'(1861)

1 Black. (U.S.) 132, 17 L. Ed. 114.
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possession, brought in a state court where the equities can be set
up as a defense.
In Lindsay v. Hawess' complainant sought to have conveyed
to him land patented to defendant after a pre-emption certificate
under which complainant claimed had been cancelled by the district
officers following a resurvey which showed that the claimant's
residence was not on the land claimed. No notice was given of
the resurvey or of the cancellation. The Supreme Court held that
the cancellation was not conclusive on complainant's rights, but
that equity might inquire into the proceedings and afford relief.
That case was followed in Minnesota v. Batchelder8 2 where a
pre-emption on a school section was claimed under a special act
by virtue of settlement thereon before survey. The register and
receiver allowed the pre-emption and patent issued. The lower
court refused to consider the charge of fraud on the ground that
the decision of the district officers was conclusive on the courts,
the remedy being by appeal to the commissioner or the secretary.
This case arose, not only after the district officers were given the
power to decide between adverse claimants, but also after the right
of appeal to the commissioner and from him to the secretary had
been granted. The Supreme Court held that a court of equity
would look into the proceedings before the register and receiver,
or even before the land office where the right of property of th
party is involved and correct errors of law or of fact to his prejudice. The opinion further stated that the pre-emption laws did
not contemplate notice to parties holding adverse interests nor a
litigation between the applicant for a pre-emption and a third
party, but that the question contemplated is between the settler and
the government. The opinion places no limitation upon the questions the court can consider and accords no weight to the decision
of the register and receiver. It is true the state alleged fraud,
which some of the earlier cases had stated would be a ground for
equitable relief from the decision of the district officers, but the
only acts of fraud alleged were false statements in the affidavits
of the applicant and his corroborating witnesses. That would not
be such fraud as would permit equitable relief against a court
judgment.8 3 The reason given" for the rule is that a consideration
of such alleged fraud in a suit for equitable relief would generally
'(1862) 2 Black (U.S.) 554, 17 L. Ed. 265.
8(1864) 1 Wall. (U.S.) 109, 17 L. Ed. 551.
'Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., sec. 489.
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involve a retrial of the issues. That reason certainly ought not to
prevail where there was, as in this case, no adversary proceeding
before the register and receiver, so that the complainant had no
opportunity of showing the falsity of the proof of his opponent.
In Frisbic v. Whitney " the question of the time of vesting of
rights under the pre-emption laws was under consideration. The
court stated that the construction by the attorney general, acquiesced in by the secretaries of the ihterior that no right vested until
proof of settlement and improvement and payment of the price was
sound. It was mnot stated that any weight was given to the conclusion of the executive.
Another method of judicial control had been attempted in
Castro v. Hendricks,5 in which mandamus was sought to compel the commissioner to issue a patent. Petitioner claimed under
a Mexican grant in California which had been confirmed by the
district court for a stated quantity of land. The surveyor-general
had certified to the claimants more land than was covered by the
grant or the decree of confirmation, and the commissioner refused
to issue the patent, his decision being affirmed by the secretary.
The court held that though the surveyor-general exercised quasijudicial power, his acts were subject to the supervision of the commissioner and the refusal to issue the patent was an appropriate
exercise of the functions of his office. The opinion did not discuss the question of the right to mandamus the commissioner.
The case of Johnson v. Towsley"6 was a suit by Towsley, the
earlier settler, to compel Johnson, a later settler, to surrender a
patent issued for the land in controversy. The register And receiver, after hearing both parties, had decided in favor of Towsley,
the commissioner had affirmed their decision and issued patent to
Towsley, but the secretary decided that, under act of March 3,
1843, sec. 4,87 Towsley was not entitled to pre-emption, having
filed a previous declaratory statement for other land which he
abandoned because the land was not open to private entry, and
ordered a patent to issue to Johnson. The state court decided in
favor of Towsley and Johnson brought the case to the United
States Supreme Court on writ of error. His counsel claimed that
the secretary's decision was final, distinguishing this case from the
-(1870) 9 Wall. 187, 19 L. Ed. 668.
'(1859) 23 How. (U.S.) 438, 16 L. Ed. 576.
*'(1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.) 72, 20 L. Ed. 485.
"5 Stat. at L. 620.
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earlier ones on the provision of act of June 12, 1858, sec. 10,11
that the decision of the commissioner should be final unless appeal
be taken to the secretary, arguing that if the decision of the inferior
is final unless appeal is taken, that of the superior on appeal must
also be. He also stressed the fact that in most of the earlier cases
the land office proceedings had been ex parte and fraud had been
charged, while here there had been a full hearing of both parties
and there was no suggestion of fraud. Mr. Justice Miller, who
delivered the opinion of the court, said that the proposition that
the decision of the Land Department was final was not a new one,
but that the question had been presented with an earnestness and
fulness of argvment which it had not, perhaps, before received
and with reference to statutes not theretofore considered by the
court so that the occasion was appropriate to re-examine the whole
subject- He had little difficulty with the argument based on the
use of "final" in the act of 1858. The purpose of that act was
merely to restore the supervisory power of the commissioner and
the word "final" was merely to exclude further inquiry in the
Department, except in case of an appeal. A much stronger argument was that founded on the general doctrine that when the law
has confided to a special tribunal the authority to hear and determine certain matters, the decision of that tribunal, within the scope
of its authority, is conclusive upon all others. Applying this principle, and the recognized exceptions to it, it was considered:
(1) That the action of the land office in issuing a patent for public
land subject to sale is conclusive as to the legal title, and in
courts where the legal title must control no inquiry can be permitted into the circumstances under which it was obtained; (2)
that the power of courts of equity to inquire into and correct mistakes, injustice and wrong in both executive and judicial action
when it invades private rights extends to decisions of the Land
Department, whose proceedings are frequently ex parte and of
such a nature as to be peculiarly liable to the influence of fraud,
false swearing and mistake, and which frequently attempted to
recall and cancel a patent, or issued conflicting patents each reserving the rights of the other party, thereby necessitating a determination of those rights by some other tribunal; (3) when the
Land Department's officers decide controverted questions of fact,
their decision, in the absence of fraud, imposition or mistake, is
final except as it may be reversed on appeal in that department;
311 Stat. at L. 326.
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(4) where the Land Department has misconstrued the law the
courts can give relief; (5) the courts will not interfere with the
discharge of the duties of the Land Department by mandamus or
injunction so long as the title remains in the United States, but
after the title has passed from the Government the courts can
inquire whether, according to the established rules of equity and
the acts of Congress, the party holding that title should hold absolutely as his own, or as trustee for another. The court then decided that the construction of the act of 1843 by the secretary was
erroneous and affirmed the decision awarding the land to Towsley.
Mr. Justice Clifford dissented on the ground that the acts of Congress had made the decision of the secretary final, except in cases
of fraud or mistake not known at the time of the investigation by
the Land Department.

In the course of the court's opinion it is said that what the
9
court did in the case of Minnesota v. Batchelder"
and Silver v.
90
Ladd was to give relief from a misconstruction of law. The
statement was true as to the latter case, but the former reversed
the state court solely on the ground that it refused to consider the
charge that the pre-emption patent was secured by fraud in presenting false affidavits. But both cases were those in which the
right to equitable relief was recognized under the rules established
in this case.
The principles laid down by Mr. justice Miller determined the
law as to the relation between the tribunals of the Land Department and the courts. Later cases have been decided by the application of these principles to the particular situation and belong
to a discussion of the relation in detail, rather than to a sketch
of the development of the Land Office administrative machinery.
It is noteworthy that in none of these cases was any question
raised as to the constitutionality of any of these acts of Congress.
In 1839, in Wilcox v. Jackson 1 it had been assumed, if not decided,
that the power of the register and receiver was judicial, yet none
of the cases discusses the question of the delegation of judicial
power to an executive department. This is the more striking in
view of the fact that four of the cases involving the review of
their acts originated in Arkansas and were decided in the years
1850-1857, and only two years later a statute of Arkansas giving

"(1863) 1 Wall. (U.S.) 109, 17 L. Ed. 551.
"(1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 219, 19 L. Ed. 138.
"(1839) 13 Pet. (U.S.) 498, 10 L. Ed. 264.
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the swamp land agents power to determine conflicting claims to the
state swamp lands was attacked as an unconstitutional delegation
of judicial power. 2 Neither the argument of counsel, as given
by the reporter, nor the opinion over-ruling the contention referred
to any federal statute or decision.
This immunity from attack on constitutional grounds while
the law was being formed was undoubtedly of great importance
in permitting the substantially complete development of administrative machinery, free from judicial control except as the effect
its decisions might subsequently be corrected by courts of equity
in adjusting the equities between the parties. By the time it became
the custom to attack all new legislation on constitutional grounds,
the organization and powers of the Land Department had been
so long established that there could be no expectation that any
attack on them would be successful.
(To be continued.)
"Hempstead v. Underhill's Heirs, (1859) 20 Ark. 337.

